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Institutional Change and Firm Creation in East-Central Europe: 
An Embedded Politics Approach 
 
Abstract 
 
A central debate about the transformation of post-communists countries is how the process of 
institution building impacts firm restructuring and creation.  This debate has largely been 
dominated by approaches that emphasize either the depoliticization of institutional designs or the 
determining impact of pre-existing social structures.  These views, however, have serious 
problems explaining one of the key comparative developments in East-Central Europe – the 
strong economic growth in Poland and the demise of the Czech Republic in the 1990s.  This 
paper explains these differences by offering an alternative, embedded politics approach that 
views firm and institutional creation as intertwined experiments.  Czech attempts to implant a 
depoliticized model of reform impeded the necessary reorganization of socio-political networks, 
in which firms are embedded.  Poland facilitated institutional experiments not only in the ways it 
promoted negotiated solutions to restructuring, but also in the ways it empowered sub-national 
governments. The study utilizes data on manufacturing networks, privatization, bankruptcy, and 
regional government reforms collected over the past six years.  1 
A central debate about the transformation of post-communist countries is how the process of 
institutional change impacts firm restructuring and creation.  Two literatures on economic 
development have largely dominated this debate.  The depoliticization approach, often found in 
economistic and developmental statist views, understands transformation as discontinuous 
change. A coherent, autonomous state imposes a new “right” set of rules and incentives on a 
tabula rasa of atomized firms and banks.  Sociological approaches tend to emphasize the 
continuity of past social structures determining firm strategy and policy choices.   
The problem is that neither of these approaches offers a convincing explanation for a key 
development during the 1990s in East-Central Europe: Poland’s strong economic growth and the 
Czech Republic’s stagnation.  Indeed, advocates of both approaches viewed the Czech case as a 
relative success and as a major source of supporting evidence. 
This essay explains the relative Czech failures and Polish successes in the restructuring 
and creation of manufacturing firms by offering an alternative embedded politics approach that 
attempts to connect productive outcomes to the organization of policy-making power.  Industrial 
adaptation is a product of institutional experiments, which in turn are shaped by the relative 
concentration and diffusion of public power. 
In this view, firm and public actors created distinct socio-political networks to obtain 
resources and to protect themselves during communism from the uncertainties of shortage 
economies.  During the transformation period, firms remain embedded in manufacturing 
networks but, in contrast to the dominant approaches, are unable to reorganize assets on their 
own.  While vital economic interdependencies constrain firm discretion and assertion of 
ownership rights, high uncertainty undermines contractual solutions to conflicts over 
restructuring strategies and asset control.  Historical social bonds between firms also fail to 
mediate conflicts.  Past norms of reciprocity depended in part on the political and material 2 
resources certain firms gained from alliances with regional political actors who now have 
essentially disappeared.  Firm restructuring and creation depend rather on how government 
policies enable interconnected firm level actors to negotiate over time their overlapping property 
rights and the reorganization of assets.  As with asset workout and risk sharing regimes typical of 
advanced industrialized countries, these processes demand that public actors mediate conflicts, 
provide partial financial relief, and monitor the new use of assets by private parties.  
This paper argues that the Czech government impeded the development of any such role 
for public actors because of its attempts to maintain a powerful, insulated state and draw a sharp 
boundary between state and society.  In contrast, Polish approaches to privatization, bank 
restructuring, and even support for new firms facilitated negotiated restructuring and risk sharing 
because of the way public power was unpacked.  A variety of national and sub-national 
government actors were empowered both to explore new institutional roles to support firm 
restructuring and creation and to monitor one another. 
Section I critiques the two dominant approaches and reviews the main arguments of an 
embedded politics approach in light of the stark differences between Polish and Czech policies 
and their manufacturing outcomes. Sections II and III then explore these arguments empirically.  
Using primary network data from the Czech Republic, I am able to define the political conditions 
and policy choices that would impede or aid the reorganization manufacturing networks.
1  I then 
compare these conditions and choices between Poland and the Czech Republic. (Ragin 1987)  
I.  Explaining the Divergence in Growth and Firm Creation 
By the end of the 1990s Poland was the economic leader in the region, especially over the Czech 
Republic.  Between 1989 and 1998, real GDP grew by 17% in Poland but declined by 4% in the 
Czech Republic, a difference largely due to relative performance in the restructuring and creation 
of manufacturing firms. (Kawalec 1999, Blaszczyk and Woodward 1999, Klich and Lipiec 2000)  3 
Not only did industrial labor productivity increase by three times more in Poland than in the 
Czech Republic, but also, as can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 1, the Poles strongly outpaced the 
Czechs in terms of growth in industrial output and the creation of manufacturing firms, indicated 
by the growth in employment in small- and medium size firms (SMEs).  How can one explain 
the stark contrast in the industrial restructuring and firm creation? 
  One explanation comes from depoliticization advocates, who view transformation as a 
moment of epochal change from communism to capitalism. Depoliticization is the ability of the 
state to eschew negotiations with economic and social actors about the initial institutional 
designs and their subsequent revisions.
2  It is achieved when the central state constructs a 
powerful, insulated “change team” to impose rapidly a new set of economic rules (ideally those 
of free trade and private property rights) that directly guide atomized firms and individuals 
toward efficient resolution of restructuring conflicts.  Rapid, mass privatization and market 
liberalization allows various claimants to assets strike “efficient bargains” – i.e., through 
enforceable contracts, liquidations, and buyouts – so that resources can be quickly directed to 
fruitful investments and new firms. (Boycko et al. 1995, World Bank 1996) 
  While one cannot deny the importance of private property rights and market forces, this 
approach suffers from explanatory problems.  First and foremost, by the mid-1990s both 
independent scholars and the multilaterals viewed the Czech Republic as the crowning success of 
the depoliticization approach, with Poland as the laggard. (World Bank 1996, Camdessus 1994, 
Frydman and Rapaczinski 1994, Boycko et al. 1995, EBRD 1995)  Orthodox communist policies 
had left the Czech Republic with a stable macro-economy, low foreign debt, poorly organized 
social and political groups, and a central government with virtually complete legal control of 
assets.
 A coalition led by Vaclav Klaus used these conditions to construct a strong policy 
apparatus that cut itself off from potential “rent-seekers,” such as parliament and special interest 4 
groups.  It weakened workers councils, dissolved regional councils (blocking their re-
establishment until 2000), and reduced the powers and resources of fragmented local 
governments.  The government liberalized trade and most prices and enacted conservative 
monetary and fiscal policies. It quickly implemented strict banking regulations, a rule-based 
recapitalization of banks, a bankruptcy law based on liquidation of defaulting debtors, and the 
privatization over 1,800 firms and four of the five main banks in less than four years through its 
now famous voucher method. 
  In contrast, although Poland implemented disciplined fiscal and monetary policies, it 
delayed firm and bank privatization. (World Bank 1996, EBRD 1995, Frydman and Rapaczynski 
1994)  Policies of partial economic and political liberalization, particularly in the 1980s, left the 
country with large fiscal deficits and foreign debts and relatively well-organized social groups 
and competing political factions, notably in Solidarity and the farmer associations.  While 
different political groups competed for policy control, such stakeholders as workers councils, 
managers and local governments intervened in and often exercised veto rights over the 
privatization of assets.  Privatization, in turn, slowed and pursued multiple goals, such as 
maximizing sales revenues and maintaining employment, rather than simply focusing on the 
rapid delineation of private ownership rights.  For instance, the Polish version of voucher 
privatization was not implemented until 1995-96, concerned only 512 firms (10% of industry and 
construction sales), and allowed for the state to maintain 25% ownership.  Privatization of the 
major Polish banks did not begin in earnest until the late 1990s.  (Jarosz 1999, Blaszczyk and 
Woodward 1999, Tang et. al. 2000) 
  As shown in Table 2, the immediate results of these contrasting approaches fortified the 
view that the Czechs were the leaders of depoliticization.  By 1995 the Czechs raced ahead of 
Poland in private sector control of industry and banking and in the provision of bank credit to 5 
private firms.  Moreover, while the Czech Republic achieved investment grade status and its 
banks exceeded the Basle banking capital adequacy ratios by 1994, studies showed that Czech 
start-ups and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) had relatively greater access to bank 
credit than their Polish counterparts. (EBRD 1995; Bratkowski et al. 1999)  
However, as both independent scholars and the World Bank have shown, the two 
proposed motors for firm restructuring and firm creation – the capital market and bank finance – 
collapsed in the Czech Republic by 1998. (World Bank 1999, Nellis 1999, Coffee 1999)  Mass 
privatization bred a combination of mismanagement by the large investment funds with cross-
holdings in the main Czech banks and speculative, insider trader schemes by new Czech 
entrepreneurs.  In the meantime, the Czech use of bankruptcy mainly as punishment and 
liquidation of delinquent debtors led the banks to view restructuring as too risky.  While non-
performing loans would grow steadily in the 1990s from 19% to 30% of total loans, they would 
decline from 30% to 10% in Polish banks. (Tang et al. 2000)  By 1999, as creditors made little 
progress in voluntary workouts, the Czech government was forced to restructure and re-privatize 
the banks and seven of the largest manufacturing firms.  Table 3 shows the extent to which the 
Poles outpaced the Czechs in the 1990s in terms of several key micro- and macro-economic 
indicators. 
  Attempts to save the depoliticization approach try to explain the Czech demise by 
referring to problems in securities laws and soft budget constraints (Johnson and Shleifer 1999, 
EBRD 1999) and the rise of Polish SMEs by referring to secure property rights (Johnson and 
Loveman 1995, Johnson et al. 2000).
3 Yet such arguments not only offer little insight into the 
creation of financial regulatory institutions but also ignore the fact that into the late 1990s the 
Polish national and sub-national governments owned and restructured most large firms and 
banks, leased firms to employees, and created regional development agencies.  In turn, the 6 
difference in productive outcomes may be less about rapid state withdrawal and privatization per 
se and more about how governments developed effective oversight capabilities as well as 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate the reorganization of assets and liabilities. 
  The dominant competing explanation about restructuring and firm creation during 
transformation comes from economic sociology.  This approach emphasizes the continuity of 
social structures, namely how the structure, density, and strength of past inter-firm and 
professional networks help gauge the ability of firms to cooperate, access new information and 
resources, maintain market positions, and innovate.
4 
  The work of David Stark is the most prominent here. (Stark 1986, 1996; Stark and Bruszt 
1998)  Stark argued that even after the fall of the party-state, firms remained embedded in 
constellations of horizontal and vertical socio-economic relationships that grew out of 
improvised responses to the uncertainties of the shortage environment during communism.  The 
reproduction of network ties provided constituent firms with reliable channels of resources and 
information as well as norms of reciprocity to help “recombine” assets in a variety of ways.  
Network analysis helped scholars compare distinctive patterns of economic organization across 
countries as well as over time.   
However, Stark over determines the ability of economic actors to preserve their network 
relations, particularly in ways that promote restructuring, rather than, corruption or poor 
management.  For instance, Stark argues that the Czech case is a prime example where past 
informal network relationships were reproduced into sound economic governance structures.  His 
evidence is the emergence of the complex interlocking ownership and financial links among the 
main Czech banks, their investment funds, and their overlapping portfolios of privatized state 
firms.  The decline of Czech restructuring and capital markets would rather suggest that the 
productive qualities of inherited networks depend on factors beyond socio-economic relations 7 
and, in turn, can be significantly shaped, positively and negatively, by a country’s approach to 
institutional change. 
My alternative, embedded politics approach attempts to identify factors of both continuity 
and change in firm behavior by understanding how the political-institutional architecture of a 
country shapes the evolution in the structure and cohesion of industrial networks.  Past economic 
and social ties can initially shape and constrain firm strategy.  But the ability of interdependent 
firms to reorganize these ties and production depends on how countries change the structure of 
political power to support policy choices about privatization and restructuring. (Johnson 2001)  
  Building on recent research in a variety of East European countries, I argue that upon 
entering the transformation period manufacturing firms were embedded in socio-political 
networks, which included regional bank and party council officials.
5   For instance, my own 
research of Czechoslovak planning in the 1970-80s showed that mid-level institutions, such as 
industrial associations (VHJs) and regional councils, took on greater decision-making rights 
over, respectively, production and social-welfare services. (Hayri and McDermott 1998 and 
McDermott 2002)  Within VHJs, firms and plants developed broad production scopes and tight 
production and financial interdependencies to limit the uncertainties of shortage.  At the same 
time, managers formed alliances with local state bank branches and party councils to gain 
privileges from the state center and create informal channels of coordination. These alliances 
provided certain member firms with political and material resources and thus intra-network 
bargaining power that solidified the governance of the network. 
  This view ties restructuring and the redefinition of property rights into a collective action 
problem.  Because of mutual subcontracting linkages or joint use of R&D plants, part of the 
value of a firm accrues from other firms in a network, and thus firms have limited individual 
discretion about how to change production.  As these firms pursue competing restructuring 8 
strategies, conflicts however emerge over production priorities, the use and control of assets, and 
the division of risk.  But resolution is not immediately forthcoming. The lack of information 
about the returns of a production strategy can be too great for a firm to give credible contractual 
guarantees to subcontractor or to a bank to finance the investment or a buyout.  Past informal 
rules of reciprocity lose value since they were derived in part from previous public actors who 
may no longer be available.  For instance, in the Czech Republic, while critical suppliers refused 
to change production for key customers, the main banks found it too risky to lead restructuring, 
despite their strong financial linkages with industrial firms. At the same time, the centralization 
of policy making power that virtually eliminated regional and local councils also cut intra-
network bargaining power for certain firms.  In turn, the force of past norms was diluted.   
  Solutions to these collective action problems would appear possible to the extent that the 
inter-linked actors can purse their different restructuring experiments while gradually redefining 
property rights and building confidence that each will take into account the interest of the other.  
Such processes are often found in institutions of advanced industrialized countries that support 
asset reorganization and risk sharing. (Cui 1995, Moss 1996, Berk 1994)  The common emphasis 
is to aid stakeholders to risky ventures – e.g., firms, workers, and creditors – in simultaneously 
improving mutual monitoring and employing assets for new uses.  To do so, these state-backed 
institutions provide limited financial breathing room, incentives for a continued flow of 
resources, and rules for frequent, disciplined negotiations among stakeholders to exchange 
property rights and information.   
  Two political-institutional conditions, in turn, arise to foster firm restructuring and 
creation.  First, to the extent that transformation policies promote institutional mechanisms that 
help parties to assets negotiate their overlapping claims while sharing risk and information, then 
these actors are more likely to extend their time horizons, reorganize network ties, invest, and 9 
build new firms.  For instance, privatization may be less about immediate delineation of 
exclusive ownership and more about how stakeholders and even new outside interests to firms 
are able to implement new production experiments while gradually exchanging control rights to 
different pieces of the assets.  Bank restructuring may be less about rapid privatization, 
recapitalization, and liquidation of delinquent debtors and more about how banks and their major 
clients learn to restructure assets and redefine the terms of their relationships.  In both cases 
certain stakeholders are delegated different restructuring responsibilities but with limited control 
rights.  At the same time they submit to rules of frequent joint deliberations that demand 
continuous information exchange and mutual evaluation of actions taken. (Sabel 1994) 
  Second, the structure of political power can impede or foster the ability of government to 
become a needed third party in promoting and supervising such activities.  The principles of 
depoliticization would tend to undermine these processes since the emphasis on the 
centralization and insulation of political power would stifle the ability of public actors to initiate 
and monitor solutions to restructuring conflicts.  On the other hand, public actors at both the 
national and sub-national level are more likely to experiment with their new institutional roles to 
the extent that they have the requisite discretion and resources.  Recent research on the 
development of institutions that promote investment and risk sharing, be they for workouts, new 
firms, or new technologies, shows that the principles of delegation and deliberation are also 
central to institutional experiments. (Sabel 1994, 1996a,b; Cohen and Sabel 1997)  By delegating 
specific restructuring or privatization responsibilities to relevant public and private actors, the 
central government obtains agents with superior information to execute policies.  Frequent 
deliberations over the goals and progress of a policy between, say, local government 
representatives or bank supervisors and the relevant managers forces each to reveal new 
information, compare results, and improve mutual monitoring over the uses of resources.   10 
The emphasis here is on how the organization of political power helps or hinders banks 
and firms govern the reorganization of manufacturing networks.  As the following section 
argues, Czech’s government’s attempt to create and maintain an autonomous, powerful central 
policy-making apparatus impeded the ability of interdependent firm and bank actors to generate 
stable collective solutions for asset reorganization.  Section 3 then argues that Poland promoted 
economic reform programs of negotiated restructuring that linked the reorganization of assets 
with gradual ownership change.  Its policies of public administration also gave a variety of 
government actors the resources and discretion to participate in and monitor these programs.   
II.  Blocked restructuring in Czech Manufacturing 
The Czech depoliticization agenda focused on quickly establishing new incentives for private 
owners and banks to restructure and create new firms.  Rapid, mass privatization, coupled with 
strengthening of the executive and weakening of sub-national government, would not only limit 
the blocking power of firm stakeholders but also create new equity owners to discipline 
management and invest.  Once recapitalized in 1991, the main banks could use their new creditor 
rights and the strict bankruptcy law to cut off problem debtors and lead restructuring.  Any 
conflicts among firms and banks over the reorganization of assets would be resolved through 
contracts, buyouts, and closures, relieving the government of any active role in the economy.   
  The case of the Czech machine tool sector is an apt example of why the depoliticization 
agenda actually undermined the stable reorganization manufacturing assets.  In general, scholars 
have viewed a country’s machine tool sector, and more broadly its machinery and equipment 
branch, as an important gauge of industrial restructuring and exports because of its position in 
the manufacturing value chain. (Herrigel 1996, Cohen and Zysman 1987, Amsden et al. 1994)  It 
also has been viewed as a major source of SME creation and flexible specialization worldwide 
since the mid-1970s. (Piore and Sabel 1984, Acs and Audretsch 1990, Carlsson 1989)  The 11 
Czech machine tool firms themselves formed the backbone of Czech industry since the early 
1900s and were recognized as leading players in the international machine tool market for most 
of the post WWII period. (McDermott 2002)  Moreover, after 1989 the Czech machine tool firms 
embraced privatization and made conscious attempts to reproduce their old network ties. 
  By 1991 Czech machine tool firms had already began breaking themselves up into 40 
firms, with the six largest organizing plants as semi-autonomous profit centers.  This process of 
coordinated decentralization came out of the sector’s inherited polycentric network structure.  
Figure 2 shows the structure and key actors within the machine tool network as it formed under 
the umbrella of the communist branch planning association in the 1980s.  For instance, member 
firms had retained considerable decision-making powers and independent financial accounts, but 
none was a dominant customer or supplier to the others.  This structure of several, horizontally 
associated firms with deep overlapping professional ties is often viewed as facilitating flexibility, 
coordination, and sharing new knowledge and resources. (Larson 1992, Kogut 2000, Rowley et 
al. 2000) The firms built on this network form in two ways. 
  First, the firms and many plants entered the first wave of privatization mainly via 
vouchers.  Second, they sought to balance individual autonomy with group cohesion by grafting 
indirect equity and financial alliances onto their past social ties.  They converted the directorate 
of their former VHJ into the headquarters of new machine tool association, SST, in which each 
firm was an owner.  As can be seen in Figure 3, SST used its historical ties to create overlapping 
equity holdings with FINOP and CSOB, the Czech leaders of international trade finance, and 
their new private bank, Banka Bohemia, in key investment funds and foreign trade companies.  
SST and the new equity links would provide members with strategic sectoral information and a 
common coordinating structure in areas where individually they were weak, such as in foreign 
trade, shared trademarks, critical inputs, vocational training, and development loans. 12 
  By 1995, however, the machine-tool network had fragmented and most firms bordered on 
insolvency.  The attempt by SST members to reinforce their past social relationships with equity 
ties and contracts and also replace past public external partners with new private financial ones 
did little to promote cooperation and restructuring. 
First, the uncertainties of new production experiments created restructuring conflicts between 
interdependent firms.  Given the lack of knowledgeable suppliers and the high costs of total in-house 
production, SST firms turned to one another for the development or sub-contracting of certain 
components and the cost sharing of exporting and importing (especially for CNC electronics).  Since 
the strategies of new product development entailed significant risks and often conflicted with one 
another, no firm could give the contractual guarantees to the others to forego their own plans and 
invest in those of the solicitor.  For instance, even when the solicitor demonstrated that the trial runs 
were for a credible international client, the small production volumes and poorly defined future 
revenue streams undermined the credibility of the project.  In turn, the potential SST suppliers 
refused to alter their own component production for the benefit of the solicitor.
6 
Second, the supporting equity alliances failed to provide needed financing to overcome the 
hold-up problems among members.  Even with the government’s partial recapitalization and debt-
relief for the banks, CSOB, like the other “big five” Czech banks, still had weak capital bases and 
tight financial links with industrial and trade firms.  But the big Czech banks found it too risky to 
lead bankruptcies or finance restructuring via the available governance mechanisms of contracts, 
liquidations, and ownership (debt-equity swaps). (Hoshi et al., 1998)  In turn, the big banks refused 
to provide credit lines directly to firms or via new banks like Banka Bohemia, and SST firms 
languished.  Indeed, in 1994, regulators closed four of the five largest de novo banks, including 
Banka Bohemia. 13 
As most collaboration collapsed, ZPS, the largest and most successful SST member, 
launched a plan in mid 1995 to acquire other SST firms instead of trying to use them as sub-
contractors.  But given ZPS’s large debts and obstinacy of the main Czech banks, ZPS used a group 
of its own small allied investment funds and new banks to channel financing from the their 
depositors, notably the partially privatized Czech Insurance Company.  ZPS and its allies attempted 
to use these funds to manipulate the share prices of SST firms and gain strategic control of them.  
This scheme came crashing down in late 1996 when two of ZPS’s allied banks went insolvent and 
regulators seized Czech Insurance.   
  By tying network reorganization to institution building, an embedded politics approach 
can make sense of the failure of past social relations and new equity ties to mediate the disputes 
among SST firms and constrain the domination strategy of ZPS.  First, the depoliticization 
agenda radically altered the network authority structure that underpinned the inherited social 
capital between firms.  As depicted in Figure 2, a key reason for the development of polycentric 
network during communism was that relevant central bank branches and regional/district 
administrative party councils had provided many firms of the old VHJ network with political and 
material resources for bargaining power vis-à-vis other machine tool firms and the central state 
ministries.  Bent on centralizing power during transformation, the Czech government literally 
and figuratively eliminated the traditional external partners for the firms, removing the power 
structure that supported the past informal decision-making rules and norms of reciprocity. 
Second, to sustain its insularity, the Czech government impeded the development of new 
institutions for restructuring.  Once mass privatization was implemented and bank were partially 
recapitalized, private contracts and a bankruptcy regime emphasizing liquidation would induce 
restructuring.  Any alternative policies, such as leasing firms, selling assets with typical 
conditions of restructuring, or promoting workouts as part of bankruptcy, would have linked 14 
ownership change and restructuring and required government oversight.  Moreover, to do so 
would have demanded empowering different public actors, be they ministries or sub-national 
governments, with the necessary discretion and resources to share some of the risks and create 
rules for the relevant parties to negotiate over time the restructuring of both operations and 
financing.  Czech transformation policy, however, strongly curtailed any such delegation of 
power and public-private deliberations.  
As such, Czech firms and their new private external partners – the main banks and 
investment funds – were left with no mechanisms to help them extend time horizons, share risk, 
and monitor one another.  Liquidation of industrial firms threatened to destroy the future client 
base of the Czech banks, and using a contract to forge a mutually binding workout agreement 
was insufficient to protect their investments and build confidence in one another.   
III.  Enabling Restructuring and Institutional Experiments in Poland   
As Czech restructuring slumped, Polish industrial output and firm creation accelerated, even in 
the machinery and equipment branch.
7  Though not always intentionally, the Polish approaches 
to privatization, bank reform, policy-making power contrasted sharply with those of the Czechs.  
These differences are summarized in Table 4.  Firm privatization and bank reform policies 
largely focused on combining restructuring and ownership change.  The government effectively 
delegated to stakeholders limited property rights that also forced them to negotiate with one 
another over the reorganization and control of assets.  At the same time, different central 
agencies and sub-national governments had the power and incentives to initiate, co-finance, and 
monitor these activities, often in collaboration with one another.  In turn, the Polish 
transformation approach helped firm and bank actors reorganize their economic linkages, while 
public actors experimented with their new institutional roles.  
Stakeholder Privatization 15 
The 1990 law on Privatization of State Enterprises reinforced the veto powers of worker 
councils and effectively blocked rapid, mass privatization.  But this law also opened two routes 
of ownership change that delegated partial use and cash-flow rights to stakeholders of mostly 
medium-sized firms and plants and gave them incentives to negotiate with one another and 
restructure assets.  By the end of 1996, these routes accounted for more than 68% and 52% of 
non-agricultural and manufacturing firms, respectively, subject to ownership change.  Both 
routes also accounted for more employment than any other route, except for firms 
commercialized but still with full state ownership.  (Jarosz 1999, Nuti 1999, Blaszczyk and 
Woodward 1999) 
The so-called, “liquidation” route, based mainly on Article 19 from 1981, sent firms 
through a specialized bankruptcy procedure that focused on debt relief and maintaining 
employment.  Over half of assets in completed projects were restructured, kept as going 
concerns, and sold or leased to a combination of managers, workers, and outsiders.    The so-
called, “direct privatization” route came through Article 37 of the 1990 Law and was the largest 
and fastest.  This law allowed employee council to legally dissolve its state firm and then have 
the assets be sold for cash or in-kind contributions or be leased to a new company, usually 
comprised of insiders.  By the end of 1996, 98% of projects for the 1247 firms in direct 
privatization were completed, far surpassing the completion rates of all other privatization 
methods.  They accounted for almost 30% of all non-bank privatization revenues.
8 Just over half 
of the employment in these firms was in manufacturing.  Over two-thirds of direct privatization 
projects were from lease options.  Lease contracts were 5-10 years and aimed specifically to 
result in gradual management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) through the lease payments.  The 
new company had to have at least 50% of employees of the original firm and make an initial 
down payment of 20% of book value.  Research tracking firms in direct privatization has shown 16 
that their financial, productivity, and output indicators are better than national and sectoral 
averages, and by 1998 only 23 MEBO firms had defaulted on their lease payments.
9   
  Articles 19 and 37, particularly MEBOs, tied asset restructuring directly to the gradual 
reordering of property rights.  This was possible for three reasons. First, Articles 19 and 37 
effectively forced multi-party negotiations, be they for creating a MEBO, keeping a firm as a 
going concern, or limiting political hold-ups during project selection.  Such negotiations between 
potential owners and stakeholders (e.g., work groups, linked plants and firms) not only helped 
limit asset theft by any individual group but also forced the different claimants to begin to take 
into account one another’s interests, vital for the development of product and process 
improvements that reach across firms.  Second, both routes relieved financial pressure on the 
firms, in turn providing breathing for firms to experiment with different restructuring strategies.  
For instance, lease contracts for MEBOs used below market interest rates and offered the option 
of deferring initial payments of up to two years.  Although MEBO firms had limited access to 
new capital investment loans, the financial relief typically allowed them to restructure via 
incremental organizational, process, and product innovations. 
Third, rather than cutting itself off from society and monopolizing power, the central 
government gained a well-placed agent to mediate between different claimants to assets by 
delegating project approval and monitoring authority to the 49 voivodships (regional 
administrations).  In becoming the legal “founders” of most firms, the voivodships could initiate 
or block a liquidation petition, evaluated direct privatization projects before they were passed to 
the central Ministry of Ownership Transformation (MOT) for final approval, and negotiated with 
MEOB candidates about certain terms of repayment.  As they had relatively simple criteria and 
could maintain much of regional employment, the two privatization routes were politically 
advantageous for the voivodships.  But excesses were monitored not only by the MOT and the 17 
17 regional fiscal audit offices of the Ministry of Interior but also by the relevant gmina 
(municipality) officials, which were freely elected, had significant resources, and could monitor 
regional policies in the voivod council.  As we will now see in the next two sections, the political 
and functional interdependencies increasingly connected the reorganization of economic 
networks with the creation of regional institutional capabilities.  
Polish Workouts of Banks and Large Firms  
The few studies on Polish manufacturing networks show that renewal of initially 
acrimonious inter-firm relations emerged in part from sub-national governments supporting 
collective problem-solving and resource flows from large firms to their SME suppliers. 
(Dornisch 1997, Yolum 2001, Despiney-Zachowska 2001)  The latter, however, was hampered 
by delays in large firm privatization and formal bankruptcy procedures.  The Polish government 
began in 1990-91 to experiment with different methods of intervention into large firms.  The 
most successful cases were the now well-known turnarounds of the Szczecin and Gdynia 
shipyards, which had been under severe financial distress.  (Johnson 1995, Keat 2002)  The 
government’s development bank initiated programs that restructured shipyards’ debts to its over 
1500 creditors (banks and suppliers) and provided trade insurance to the shipyard’ main 
customers.  In return, shipyard management, worker’s councils, and key suppliers had to initiate 
a thorough restructuring of operations and the value chain.  Progress was evaluated through 
regular joint meetings among representatives of government, the main banks, and the groups just 
mentioned.  The eventual privatization of both shipyards resulted in an ownership being divided 
among management, workers, the central government, relevant local governments, the largest 
suppliers, and the public. 
  When the growing stock of bad loans to firms threatened financial stability in 1992, the 
government viewed case-by-case approaches and court proceedings as too slow.   The Czech 18 
response was a one-time partial bank recapitalization, after which the incentives from rapid 
privatization, new creditor rights, and the bankruptcy as liquidation law would propel the main 
banks to lead firm restructuring.  The Polish government rejected this approach, arguing that it 
would not change bank-firm relations or government oversight capabilities and would destroy 
value in the meantime.  Rather, the shipyard cases became the basis of a broader government led 
workout regime that purposefully tied simultaneous bank and firm restructuring with gradual 
redefinition of property rights.  Whereas the Czech approach, which led to failure and another 
bailout, would cost taxpayers over 25% of GDP by the end of the 1990s, the Polish approach 
would cost only 7% of GDP. (Tang et al. 2000) 
In 1993, the Finance Ministry launched the Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program 
(EBRP).
10  The government offered seven of the nine main commercial banks (which held about 
60% of outstanding enterprise debt) a one-time recapitalization sufficient to deal with classified 
debts that originated prior to 1992.  In return, the banks had to establish workout departments 
and had to reach a debt resolution agreement with their main debtors by March 1994, to be fully 
implemented by March 1996.  Such an agreement allowed for 5 paths, including demonstration 
of full debt servicing (about 40% of the 787 total firms), bankruptcy, liquidation, debt sale, and a 
new regime called “bank conciliation”.  This last route became the most popular method of 
dealing with problem firms (23% of firms and 50% of debt) and was widely judged by outsiders 
as a successful, efficient policy that significantly improved the performance and governance of 
banks and firms.  (Gray and Holle 1998 and Montes-Negret and Papi 1996) 
Since EBRP, and conciliation in particular, demanded regular government evaluation of 
decentralized actions taken by banks and firms, the governance principles again were delegation 
of restructuring authority to stakeholders, multi-party risk sharing, and government monitoring 
via iterative deliberations among the parties to assets.  First, the Deputy Finance Minister 19 
purposefully used regular deliberations to enhance monitoring and learning.  After receiving the 
restructuring authority and the basic criteria of EBRP, the lead managers of the workout 
departments of the seven banks met together every month for over a year with relevant 
representatives of the Finance Ministry, the Privatization Ministry, the Central Bank’s 
supervisory division, and the state auditor.  In these meetings, the banks had to reveal how they 
were and were not making progress in the restructuring of their own balance sheets and the 
firms.  The collective, iterative evaluation process created a constant flow of information, which 
government officials and bank managers used to compare and rate one another’s actions over 
time, detect flaws, limit favoritism, and negotiate updated terms of workouts.  At the same time, 
the deliberations allowed the banks to learn from one another the pitfalls and benefits of different 
restructuring methods and the government actors to learn how to improve their own auditing and 
monitoring techniques. 
Second, a similar negotiation process with creditors, firms, and regional public officials 
took place at the regional level.  For instance, in his detailed analysis of the turnaround in heavily 
industrialized region of Lodz, Dornisch (1997, 2000) notes that the negotiations between the 
regional bank, voivodship (as the founder of the firms), the local tax office and firm management 
led to new channels of information sharing.  As the voivodship learned to forge compromises 
between the bank and firms, the three parties extended workout negotiations to include the 
gradual reorganization of supply networks.  As a result, EBRP framework not only helped large 
firms and their suppliers redefine the terms of their common production lines, but also led the 
bank to develop new services.  The Lodz bank soon developed successful regional equity and 
venture capital funds out of its workout department.  This bank and others also developed special 
write-off provisions for SME suppliers of the large firms included in EBRP. 20 
Taken together, direct privatization and EBRP created concrete frameworks for 
stakeholders to pursue restructuring experiments while gradually redefining their common claims 
to assets.   To support and effectively monitor such negotiated solutions, the central government 
could not isolate itself but had to empower public actors at various levels of society.  This marks 
a third fundamental different between the Polish and Czech approaches to transformation: the 
distribution of public power.  Regional and local governments in Poland were facilitating 
network reorganization not simply as agents of the central state but also as builders of new 
institutional capacities in their own right.  
Institution Building and the Political Matrix of Sub-National Governments 
Both Polish and Czech reformers were highly concerned about continued control by 
communist apparatchiks of regional and local councils and maintaining a unitary state.  But their 
methods of dealing with them contrasted sharply.
11  The Czechs eliminated regional councils, 
allowed municipal and district councils to fragment into numerous small uncoordinated units, 
and restricted their participation in economic reforms.  In contrast, the Poles 49 maintained 
voivodships, and gminas are considerably fewer and larger than their Czech counterparts, with 
greater stocks of resources and autonomy over revenues and expenditures. (OECD 2000)  For 
instance, Gorzelak (1998) estimates that gminas provided about 50% of new public infrastructure 
in Poland during the 1990s.   This resource distribution provided sources of policy initiative as 
well as the basis for inter-governmental bargaining power and monitoring within the regional 
political matrix. 
On the one hand, a voivodship governor was directly responsible to the central 
government, had specific mandates in privatization and restructuring, and was charged with 
ensuring the legality of gmina policies. (Regulska 1997)  On the other hand, voivodships could 
not ignore the gminas.  The central government usually consulted with gminas over the 21 
appointment of a voivod governor.  The voivod council, comprised of gmina representatives, 
reviewed all voivodship policies, although the gminas did not have formal veto powers, other 
than withholding resources and lobbying the central government.  In turn, the Polish government 
economic reforms not only employed well positioned agents to implement policy but also 
triggered a variety of public actors to monitor and collaborate with one another in supporting 
firm restructuring and creation within the well-balanced matrix of political autonomy and 
interdependence. 
To become an effective participant in policies like direct privatization and EBRP, a 
voivodship typically combined its relative authority and organizational resources with the social, 
informational, and human resources of the regional bank, firms, consultants, gminas and the 
audit agency.  These initial steps became a resource for gminas and economic actors to expand 
their portfolios of strategies, collaborators and project screening capabilities. For instance, when 
EBRP was launched, the regional banks lacked effective monitoring capabilities.  In turn, they 
began to supplement their deficiencies by participating in regular voivod council meetings and 
accessing the voivod data base.  The pilot experience in restructuring firms in EBRP, and in 
some case becoming co-owners of them, led the Lodz Bank and voivodship to co-manage a 
closed World Bank investment fund for initially 20 firms. (Dornisch 1999, 2000) 
This interaction led to a dramatic rise in local and regional public-private institutions, 
such as 1500 business support centers and 23 mutual loan guarantee funds, to support large firm 
restructuring, SME growth, and manufacturing networks. (Woodward 2001, Gorzelak 1998, 
Yolum 2001)  Such institutions grew out of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs).  By 1996, 
Poland had 66 RDAs throughout the country, whereas the Czech Republic had only two.  With 
initial support of the Polish Agency for Regional Development and the Industrial Development 
Agency (IDA), gminas, voivodship, and firms created RDAs mainly to provide low cost services 22 
to new and transforming state firms that alone could not access them.  As RDAs are typically 
joint stock companies, the most significant owners are usually voivodships, gminas and the IDA.  
Firms saw RDAs as critical sources of consulting, training, investment promotion, business 
incubators, and loan guarantees.  (Gorzelak 1998)  Indeed, when comparing regions, researchers 
have found high and strong positive relationships between the density and diversity of public-
private institutions, on the one hand, and relatively high rates industrial restructuring, 
participation in direct privatization (especially via MEBOs), SME creation, and the reception of 
FDI on the other. (Hausner et al. 1995, 1997, 1998; Jarosz 1999) 
  Although initiatives related to RDAs and firm restructuring were often fraught with 
delays and failures, the political and resource interdependencies demanded that the relevant 
regional public and private actors continually renew the process of collective problem solving. 
(Dornish 1997, 2000)  In being forced to jointly administer and evaluate privatization, 
restructuring and development projects early on, the relevant firm, bank, and government actors 
began to learn about how to monitor one another and share authority over common assets.  This 
experience in turn helped them define a reasonable set of new common projects and how to 
assess one another’s actions and contributions.  Institutional development was not coming from a 
grand design from above but from stakeholders finding ways to address one another’s interests 
while experimenting with new institutions roles for the demands of asset reorganization. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
This essay has argued that an embedded politics approach may prove more useful than 
depoliticization and continuity approaches in analyzing restructuring and firm creation, at least in 
East Central Europe.  Similar to recent work by Woodruff (1999), Jacoby (2000), and Johnson 
(2001), my approach is an attempt to bring issues of political power and democratic governance 
back into the debates on institutional change and economic reform.  The value-added of my 23 
approach is that it is more explicit about how the distribution of political power can impact both 
productive outcomes and the open-ended process of constructing new institutions. 
Socio-political networks mediate between two simultaneous, interdependent experiments 
-- micro-level experiments by firms and banks to reorganize common assets and macro-level 
experiments by policy-makers to build new institutions.  The restructuring of networked assets 
demand institutional workout mechanisms that help the different claimants negotiate over time 
the redistribution of risk and property rights.  Since public actors are both constituents to 
networks and often key players in such institutions, restructuring in turn depends on the ways 
that different national and sub-national organs are given the legitimacy and resources to explore 
their roles as risk-sharers, initiators, and monitors of the negotiations.   
  At one level, inter-linked firms and banks are attempting to learn how construct new 
formal and informal methods of mutual monitoring and project selection.  This is where asset 
restructuring is tied to network reorganization.  At another level, public actors, be they the 
central agencies or regional governments, are learning how to provide financial and 
organizational support to firms and banks while experimenting with different ways to monitor 
the latter.  In turn, the embedded politics approach argues that public actors are most effective in 
combining learning and monitoring, for themselves and for economic actors, when 
transformation policies are based on the principles of delegation and deliberation.  
This essay has tried to show that Poland created political conditions more conducive for 
institutional experimentation.  Czech impediments to institutional experiments came not only 
from the government’s attempt to rapidly privatize firms and banks but also from its attempt to 
create and maintain an autonomous, powerful central policy-making apparatus.  In contrast, 
Poland’s relative economic success in the 1990s came from economic policies that linked the 
reorganization of assets with gradual ownership change as well as institutional policies that gave 24 
a variety of government actors the resources and discretion to participate in restructuring and 
monitor one another’s actions.  
In trying to connect the politics of institutional change to economic restructuring, my 
argument invites two areas of additional scrutiny.  First, the essay suggests that the creation of 
public-private institutions that induce risk sharing and mutual monitoring are vital to economic 
development.  I have emphasized here the role of workout institutions, but institutions such as 
loan guarantee systems for mortgages and SMEs, lender of last resort, deposit insurance, limited 
liability, and subsidized working training and R&D are all equally important in advanced 
industrialized countries.  The importance of such institutions is that they help private actors 
invest in relatively uncertain activities while providing systemic stability.  They however open 
up the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection, because of the inherent socialization of risk.  
But just as the creation of investor protection institutions demand government oversight and 
enforcement capabilities, so too do these other institutions demand the creation of government 
capabilities to initiate and monitor risk sharing programs.  The dual challenge for researchers is 
not only to determine the impacts of such institutions on productive outcomes but also to capture 
how public actors experiment with these new roles.  This experimentation is above all about 
building up effective monitoring capabilities to learn where government is needed most and how 
it can ensure efficient use of public funds. 
Second, this essay also suggests that organization of political power impacts the 
governance of institutional experimentation.  My discussion of the importance of sub-national 
administrations was meant simply to illustrate that institutional experimentation requires, at a 
minimum, the empowerment of a variety of government actors to explore different policy 
approaches and have the political voice to relay them back to higher-level bodies.  There is a 
significant body of research on advanced industrialized countries (Locke 1995, Herrigel 1996, 25 
Saxenian 1994, Piore and Sabel 1984), developing countries like Brazil and China (Tendler 
1997, Oi 1999), and even in Russia (Petro 2001) that show that sub-national governments play 
critical roles in facilitating economic development and becoming laboratories for new public 
policy.  At the same time, however, it would be misguided to think that simply decentralization 
is the answer to development, as it can equally turn into grounds for local strongmen and 
corruption.  Rather, the evidence presented on Poland suggests that effective institutional 
development comes not only from empowering local public and private stakeholders but also 
how policies and political institutions are created to enhance mutual monitoring.  Indeed, the 
research on Russia (Woodruff 1999), China (Oi 1999, Oi and Walder 1999), Brazil (Tendler 
1997), and Argentina (Jones et al. 2002) has also shown that the differences in the distribution 
and governance of policy-making power among sub-national governments can account for the 
ability of countries to initiate and sustain institutional reforms.  I have argued that the governance 
principles of delegation and deliberation may turn the potential for local abuse and self-dealing 
between public and private actors into benefits for the public welfare.  In this view, then the 
ability of the 1999 reforms in Polish sub-national governments to sustain the gains made in the 
1990s would depend on how the reforms supported or undermined these governance principles. 
But whether you fully agree or not with that argument, though, is perhaps less important than 
moving research on economic development away from the ideal designs at the commanding 
heights and toward the way polities govern institutional change at multiple levels of society.  26 
Table 1:  Divergence in SME Growth in Manufacturing 
                Firms with Less than 250 Employees 
 
 Czech  Republic 
(1989-1997) 
Poland 
(1989-1997) 
Change in Share of Employment in 
Private Sector Firms (%) 
46.3% 54.2% 
Sources: Czech Statistical Office (Author’s calculations); Polish Foundation for SME Promotion 
and Development (1999). 
 
Table 2:  Divergence in Privatization (1995) 
 
  % of GDP in 
Private Hands 
% of firms in 
Private Hands 
% of Industrial 
Output in 
Private Hands 
% of Bank 
Assets w/in State 
Banks 
Czech Republic 
 
70 90 93  19.5 
Poland 
 
60 46 60  71.1 
Sources:  EBRD (1996),  Pohl et al. (1997), World Bank (1996), Tang et al. (2000) 
 
Table 3. Key Economic and Financial Indicators for the Czech Republic and Poland 
 
Budget Deficit/GDP  Foreign Debt/GDP Debt  Service/Exports    Change in 
Real 
GDP, 
1989-98 
Change in 
Industrial 
Labor 
Productivity, 
1989-98 
1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998 
Czech 
Republic 
-4% +13.6%  3.1%  1.6%  23.0%  44.7%  12.0%  14% 
Poland 
 
+17% +42.2% 6.7% 2.4% 57.7%  27.1%  16.0% 9.0% 
Sources: Kawalec (1999), Business Central Europe (Selected years at www. bcemag.com) 27 
Table 4. Contrasting Approaches to Building Workout Mechanisms in Manufacturing 
 
Policy Issue  Czech Republic  Poland 
Ownership Change  Rapid, Mass Privatization via 
Vouchers. 
Gradual methods linked with 
restructuring, mostly via “liquidation” 
and “direct” privatization, esp. until 
1996. 
Bank Restructuring  One-time partial debt write-off & 
recapitalization. 
Enterprise Bank Restructuring 
Program (EBRP), 1993-96, links bank 
and large firm restructuring. 
Large Firms – EBRP. 
 
Firm Restructuring  - Contracts and strict bankruptcy 
law focused on liquidation 
- Failed attempt to net-out inter-
firm debt. 
Medium & Small Firms – 
“liquidation” and “direct” methods of 
privatiz’n (e.g., leasing). 
Organization of 
Policymaking 
   
- National Level  
Strong, autonomous change team in 
Mins. of Finance & Priv’n focus of 
rapid implementation of vouchers, 
bank recapitalization, and new 
laws. 
Mins. of Finance & Priv’n build 
capabilities to initiate and monitor 
EBRP & gradualist methods of priv’n; 
Build strong regulations for capital 
market; Give roles to sub-nat’l gov’ts.
- Sub-national 
Levels 
- Regional councils eliminated; 
- Districts and Municipalities 
fragmented and weak. 
 
- Voivodships (regional gov’ts) 
empowered to screen and monitor 
priv’ns, assist in EBRP, build RDAs; 
- Gminas (municipalities) work with 
Voivodships on restructuring, RDAs 
and bond market. 
 28 
 
 
Source : OECD (1999) in Spicer et al. (2000) 
 
FIGURE 1. Industrial Production in the Czech Republic and Poland
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Private bank 
(Banka Bohemia) )   
Investment fund 
(1st engineering) )   
Industry association
(SST) 
11%
SST firms 
Members  
own 
SST 
ISB and fund own 
5-20% of SST firms
10.7%
➫ SST firms together own 30 
to 40% of Strojimport. 
➫ SST manages these shares.
➫ SST president is chair of 
board of Strojimport. 
FIGURE 3:  Network Ties in the Czech Machine Tool Industry   
Trading house 
(Strojimport)
Trading bank 
(CSOB) 
Czech Government 
(Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, 
Fund for National Property) 
Financial group 
(FINOP) 
Investment company 
(ISB)
30-40% 
» 20%
Large debts to CSOB
Note: Direction of arrow denotes direction of ownership  
          Percentages denote ownership share. 
           
Adapted from McDermott (2002, Chapter 5).   31
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Endnotes 
                                                           
1 Although Czechoslovakia (CSFR) split in January 1993, I focus on the Czech Republic.  There was strong 
continuity in policy for the Czech lands before and after the split, as the main economic policy makers for the CSFR 
and the Czech Republic remained largely the same.  All firms analysed below were always part f the Czech lands as 
well.  The network, firm and institutional data for the Czech Republic come from mainly my field work between 
1993 to 1996, during which time I conducted over 130 interviews with relevant ministerial, bank, and firm actors 
and collected primary and secondary firm, bank, and sectoral level data. (See McDermott, 2002)  The Polish data 
come mainly from secondary sources cited below as well as interviews with relevant firm, bank, and government 
officials in February 2002. 
2  See McDermott (2002) for a discussion of depoliticiation views as they appear in economics, rational choice, and 
developmental statism.  My critique draws on observations by Mood and Prasad (1994), Grindle (1991), and Murrell 
(1993).  For examples see Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Sachs (1990), and Haggard and Kaufman (1992, 1995). 
3 Actually, Johnson and Loveman build on the seminal argument of Janos Kornai (1990).  Kornai argued that 
growth would come from the liberalized second economy.  In the meantime, the state would have to reassert 
governance control over managers in the state sector.  But Kornai appears to also draw a sharp line between the new 
private sector (or new firms) and the existing state sector. 
4 The structural sociological veiws can be found in Putnam et al. (1993) and Chavance and Magnin (1997). Leading 
reviews on networks include Granovetter (1985), Powell (1990), Rowley et al. (2000), Kogut (2000), Larson (1992).  
Apllications of this work on East European firm restructuring and creation include Spenner et al. (1998) and Sedatis 
(1997). 
5 For work on the former USSR, Poland, GDR, and Hungary, see, for instance, Prokop (1996), Woodruff (1999), 
Dornisch (1997, 1999), Jacoby (2000), Seleny (1993), Szelenyi (1988), Dambrowski et al. (1991) and Levitas 
(1994).  Even in Stark and Bruszt (1998), there are strong suggestions of the interconnection between local political 
actors and managers (see, for instance, Ch. 4). This approach draws on work on advanced industrial districts, such as 
Locke (1995), Piore and Sabel (1984) and Herrigel (1996). 
6 Similar fates met efforts to clarfiy firm specializations, collaborate in exports and imports, and use the vocational 
training system.  An added fear was that firms were beginning to encroach on one another’s traditional prodcut lines.  
See McDermott (2002, Ch. 5)   
7 According to data from the Polish and Czech National Statistical Offices, for Nace 29, Machinery and Equipment, 
real production increased from 1995 to 2000 by 5.92% in the Czech Republic and 19.1% in Poland, while by 1999 
SMEs accounted for 35.97% of sectoral employment in the Czech Republic and 41.59% in Poland. 
8 This figure is generated from total non-bank privatization revenues through the direct and indirect paths of 
privatization.  See Jarosz, p. 35, Table 4 (1999). 
9 In 1990, there were 8441 state enterprises.  By December 1996, 5592 firms had entered a track of ownership 
transformation. There were two major systematic studies of 200 of these firms (across industries and regions) in 
1995 and 1998 (Jarosz, 1996, 1999; Kozarzewski and Woodward 2000) 
10 I draw here mainly on the works of Gray and Holle (1998b), Dornisch (1997, 2000), and Montes-Negret and Papi 
(1996) as well as oninterviews in February 2002 with participants in EBRP from the Ministry of Finance, National 
Bank of Poland, and former executives of the bank in Lodz. 
11 For instance, the number of Czech municipalities grew by 50% by 1991 to 6237 with an average size of 1700 
inhabitants, while Polish gminas maintained most of there integrity (2466 gminas with average size of 15, 000 
inhabitants). For analysis of the political, resource, and financial differences, OECD (2000), Baldersheim, Illner, 
Offerdal, Rose, and Swianiewicz (1996), Gorzelak (1998), Levitas (1999), and Innes (2002).  
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